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OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Edward McWhinneyt
I notice that I seem to be almost alone among those whom you 
have invited officially to celebrate the opening of your new Law 
building, in being neither a Dean nor an ex-Dean. I take it that 
this indicates one can get to Heaven in New Brunswick without 
being a Law Dean, if this is the sign of ultimate grace.
You asked me to talk on the Quest for Justice and the role 
of government, and I would be insensitive to events and people 
if I did not record my pleasure in being in a programme that includes 
people like Chief Justice McRuer. I travelled on the plane with 
him here to Fredericton, and I reminded him that I was the first 
person to give evidence before what will, I think, go on to become 
a classic, in the Western world, of the empirically-based, institu­
tionally-grounded approach to civil liberties; that is to say, the 
McRuer Commission Report on Civil Rights.1 Chief Justice McRuer 
sent a message to me, I believe. At least, one of my former students 
who was then acting as counsel assisting the Commission came to 
me and said, “The Chief Justice wants you to present a brief” . And 
I said, “ Why does he want a brief?” . “ Well” , I was told, “ he wants 
you to present the brief and he really wants poetry for the first 
brief; he’ll get the law later” . So I gave him my brief2 and I hope 
it was poetry. I am sure it was prose at least and I have felt, on this 
account not least, a certain interest in the work of the McRuer 
Commission. There are, however, intellectually far weightier grounds 
for being interested in the Commission’s final outcome: for Chief 
Justice McRuer arrived on the scene at a time when all Western 
society was beginning to be concerned—at least the thinking people 
in Western society—about problems of big government, problems 
of institutional reform; and the Province of Ontario decided, before 
this public concern reached tidal wave proportions, to do something 
concrete about it.
I will have a little bit more to say later about Chief Justice 
McRuer’s Commission, and the Canadian approach to civil liberties
f  Professor o f Law, McGill University, Montreal; Royal Commissioner, 
Commission d ’enquête sur la situation de la langue française et sur les 
droits linguistiques au Québec.
1 Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Province o f Ontario, (the 
McRuer Commission), Report Number I, volumes 1-3 (1968).
2 The brief is re-published under title, A new base for Civil Liberties, Canadian 
Bar Journal, (February 1965), p. 28 et seq.
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for the future. Let me now say something about constitutional 
theory and about philosophy of law in general, since this so largely 
conditions and controls particular national ventures in concrete 
institutional and procedural changes.
For the North American Law School at least, truth isn’t an 
abstract quality inherent in an idea; truth is something that happens 
to ideas in the general unfolding of history. We do try to teach our 
students today that the good law is that which in certain measure 
reflects society, and therefore the good law in a very real sense is 
revolutionary law since Society itself is in a state of flux today—a 
state of revolution. I am not speaking here necessarily of the hippies, 
for they represent only one species of revolution. Surely, the greatest 
revolution of our times is the technological revolution, which in­
cludes now access to and control of nuclear energy and power. If 
you look at its impacts in societies as ideologically disparate as 
the Soviet Union and the United States, you can find common 
technical conditions producing common community problems and, 
increasingly, common informed technical legal responses.3
Now we are all of us believers in sociological jurisprudence and 
in the necessary and proximate relationship or symbiosis between 
law and society; and I think that this does give us a certain humility 
in our approach to problems, and a certain realization that the 
Sermon on the Mount and holistic, a priori formulae are not very 
much help in solving the concrete, practical problems of our times. 
So we are dedicated, instead, to pragmatic, empirical, problem- 
oriented methods. In opening this subject generally, I thought I 
might refer you to some concrete problems that I have been interested 
in, in various academic and professional capacities, because these 
problems reflect, in their concrete solutions, the pragmatic, empirical 
approach, and they also represent what is a new and important 
element in our general national approach to law, — that we have 
now become, perforce, intellectually eclectic and interested in com­
parative legal science. We are suddenly realising that what happens 
in Canada is not without interest to the rest of the world; and that 
what happens in the rest of the world may point up and illuminate 
the solution of our own legal problems in Canada.
There was reference during one of the earlier papers presented 
at these official celebrations, to Germany, and this will bring me 
to the first major excursus that I intend to make into comparative 
legal science—into the comparative quest for justice in the public 
law experience of other legal systems. There was reference, I believe, 
to the situation in Germany in the I930’s, and I think somebody 
said that the law schools were taken over then by the Nazi Party.
3 Some of these ideas are examined in greater detail in my International Law 
and World Revolution (1967), pp. 1-12.
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I don’t think that is quite true, and I wonder if I might spend some 
comments on this particular problem. I think the tragedy in Germany 
was not that the law schools were taken over by the Nazi Party, but 
that they went on very much as before. There were perhaps a few 
German legal scholars, if you think of Carl Schmitt and one or two 
others who deservedly should be forgotten today, who did take up 
the Nazi régime and become, if you wish, its legal apologists. But, 
by and large, the academic lawyers and the judiciary in Germany 
took no part in the Nazi movement. What the legal establishment 
did, in effect, was to isolate itself from the problem. I think I can 
illustrate this very dramatically to you by saying that the Civil 
Code of Germany, the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1900, was the 
same in 1933, essentially, as in 1900; and the same in 1945 essentially 
as in 1933; and it is much the same today, in 1968, in West Germany 
as in East Germany. What in effect happened, in this situation, was 
that a great and powerful profession confined its attentions to the 
Civil Code, and a great and powerful profession confined itseif to 
applying the ordinary law in the ordinary courts. The perversions 
of justice, in the bigger sense, in Germany in the Hitler era, were 
accomplished, really, by special statutes and special courts removed 
from the ordinary processes. This thing can happen in a civilised 
society, of course, and I know my American friends here will not 
mind if I cite an American example. The 13th, 14th and 15th Amend­
ments to the United States Constitution were certainly normative 
for a very large part of the American population from the period of 
their first enactment immediately after the Civil War, onwards. But 
for other, significant sections of the American population they were 
really not normative in the sense of creating legal norms that were 
actually operative in day-by-day conduct of citizens, — that is, they 
were not community living law, and were not really, I suppose, until 
Chief Justice Warren’s decision in 1954, in the School-segregation 
case.4 This sort of hiatus between Law and Society—the gap between 
the law-in-books (the positive law as written in texts and codes) and 
the law-in-action (the de facto  community attitudes and practices) 
can happen, and one of the problems in the post-war quest for 
justice in Germany, which occurred under the impact of the allied 
military governments was : how do you achieve legal de-Nazification ? 
Well you could have started by firing all the lawyers—all the profes­
sors and all the judges; but a superficial examination quickly in­
dicated that while some of the judges might benefit by being de- 
Nazified, and some of the professors perhaps too, very few of these 
had been Nazis in the proper sense. You might have said that some 
of these were certainly timid people, or you might have said that 
they were people who had a conveniently short vision; but on the
4 Brown v. Board o f Education o f Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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whole, as I have said, the ordinary Civil Law went on in the period 
after 1933, very much as before.
Now this era of Allied military occupation after 1945 is one 
of the really interesting periods in Western Law; and it contains the 
sort of problems that exercised me when I was a young professor of 
Jurisprudence. How do you really go about re-introducing justice 
in the defeated Axis countries—Germany, Italy, and Japan? Well, 
if we consider the case of Germany in particular, you will find, if 
you study the German legal literature of the immediate post-War 
period, that Natural Law was rediscovered. The great Heidelberg 
legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch, who had preached all his life 
the concept of legal relativism, suddenly conceded, in the first post- 
War edition of his Rechtsphilosophie, that, in some circumstances, 
relativist criteria of justice should yield to certain absolutist criteria 
of justice; though he was not terribly clear or specific about when 
this should occur or as to what these absolutist criteria were.
There were half a dozen or more court decisions in post-War 
Germany that reflected this neo-Natural Law influence. There were 
rather strange decisions, if one can use the term “ strange” in a 
technical legal sense. There were, for example, the interesting cases 
of women who claimed to have taken seriously the Nazi regime’s 
request to citizens to be activists and to denounce defeatists and 
enemies of the German people. Wives would suddenly appear to 
the secret police and say: “ I believe my husband is disloyal and he 
is a bad man; for the future of the country, something should be 
done about him” ; and something usually happened. The husbands 
would then usually be given the option of being tried for treason in 
Hitler’s special tribunals or else of being sent to the Russian front, 
which usually amounted to the same result at that stage of the War. 
Unfortunately for some of these wives, but fortunately for the cause 
of legal philosophy, one or two of these husbands actually managed 
to survive the Russian front. They came back after the war and 
you had quite an interesting period in German law, with interesting 
legal actions under this neo-Natural Law impetus. One such husband 
brought an action against his wife under section 239 of the German 
Criminal Code of 1871—still in force in the Nazi era and also in the 
post-War period—for “ unlawful deprivation of another’s liberty” . 
The husband also brought the same action against the special Judge 
who had heard the case against him. Well, in the end, the wife was 
given the mid-twentieth century equivalent of the ducking stool. She 
was convicted, but the special Judge was acquitted.
It was an interesting period in German constitutional and 
general legal history, and the legal philosophers wrote about it. 
But, on the whole, the main impact of that experience and the main 
concrete achievements in the post-war search for justice in Germany
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were simple institutional ones. Now these particular institutional 
innovations are of considerable interest and value to constitutional 
lawyers in our own country; yet the fact remains that, after all the 
philosophical discussion—the Sturm und Drang, if we may use the 
German term, they seem relatively modest and un-poetic—essentially 
empirically-based changes. If one were looking at it solely in terms 
of the legal folk-lore, one might, in the sense of the Latin aphorism 
even say that the mountain laboured and produced a mouse. But 
that would be to miss the whole point in an important exercise in 
concrete, problem-oriented legal reform and change. For the two 
things that happened, really, in post-War Germany—West Ger­
many—were a strong decentralisation in the German government— 
a decentralised type of federalism in comparison to the pre-war 
system—and a vastly strengthened Supreme Court.
I must say that in a study that I made some years ago of these 
particular constitutional innovations I came to the conclusion that 
the strengthened Supreme Court—in fact, a special constitutional 
court—was the most imaginative and hopeful feature of post-War 
German constitutionalism; and in some ways it seemed to me, with 
the reviving nationalist spirit in Germany, that perhaps it was the 
only really strong and effective institutional guarantee for maintain­
ing and strengthening a democratic system of government in Ger­
many. I became rather enthusiastic about it and so I wrote a book 
on the theme.5 I noted, with great interest, that the most recent 
Yugoslav Constitutional Commission set up to clear away the last 
remnants of Stalinism and really to achieve an institutionally-based 
democratic socialism, decided upon a special constitutional court, 
as the main instrument for achieving those goals, and unashamedly 
adopted the post-War German court as their model. Even more 
recently, the same idea and the same model have been taken up 
by Quebec nationalists and by Quebec separatists, though for reasons 
not entirely related to what I was discussing in the book. But that 
is another story. It just shows you that if you write a book on a 
great political issue, it may end up serving as footnotes in rather 
strange contexts.
The big constitutional innovation in post-War Germany then 
—the principal, concrete mode of institutionalisation of the quest for 
justice—was thus the system of the special constitutional court. 
There remains, also, the achievement of a far more decentralised 
federalism than had existed before in Germany—this to be effected, 
mainly, through a very strong Senate. If you read again some of the 
very interesting Quebec nationalist literature, you will find that the 
German Senate again is an ideal-type or model for the “ new wave”
5 Constitutionalism in Germany and the Federal Constitutional Court (1962).
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Canadian constitutionalism—a reformed Senate, with thinking 
people in it, an idea that seems now to be accepted and sponsored 
also (though with rather different incidents and elements) by the 
federal Government’s Senate majority leader, Senator Paul Martin.6 
I gather, however, that this particular proposal for constitutional 
change in Canada—imaginative and well-researched as it is—is 
running into difficulties with the federal government’s own Party 
caucus in the lower House, which apparently fears that some of the 
special privileges of the lower House will thereby be whittled away.
Now this is an interesting conclusion to all that post-1945 legal 
excitement and all the pressures by the Allied Military Control forces. 
Somebody said: “ Well, it’s typical! The Germans had to become 
democratic to join the Western Alliance again, and the only way to 
become democratic in the eyes of the American Military government 
officials, was to adopt an American-style constitution. If you want 
to get rid of the American army (whether in Germany, or for that 
matter in post-1945 Japan) adopt an American-style constitution!” 
I think this is a little cynical because it has seemed to me that the 
German court in some ways, and I said this in my study of it, in 
some ways has been a more effective court even than its original 
model, the United States Supreme Court: — in the election cases 
and certain related matters, for example, that anticipated some of the 
major reversals made in the late 1950s by the United States Supreme 
Court of earlier decisions. Nevertheless, the quest for justice in 
Germany, after perhaps the most agonizing period of intellectual 
and moral crisis that any country can go through, has institutionalised 
itself finally in these two main elements of constitutional innova­
tion—a special federal constitutional court; and a more substantially 
decentralised federal system than heretofore, achieved in part 
through a more powerful federal upper house. The legal folklore, 
the natural law element, has disappeared, for better or for worse, 
into history, and it is now just a footnote in various historical sur­
veys or commentaries on legal philosophy.
Now, if I can cite another example before getting on to our 
Canadian discussion, I think you may know that a special Commis­
sion was constituted by the Japanese Cabinet some years ago to 
advise on, and if possible to devise, a new constitution for Japan. 
I think you may also possibly know that the present Japanese 
Constitution is not a very elegant one. I’m not sure if constitutions 
should be elegant; I was once at a diplomatic cocktail party where, 
at a certain stage of the evening, a very distinguished official began
6 See, in this regard, the recently published federal Government White
Paper: —  The Constitution and the People o f Canada. An approach to
the Objectives o f  Confederation, the Rights o f People and the Institutions
o f  Government (Ottawa, 1969), pp. 28-34.
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to sing the Preamble of the United Nations Charter. It can be sung, 
of course. Indeed, it sings beautifully. It’s pure poetry; and it ought 
to be, for it was written by a poet. President Franklin Roosevelt 
made Archibald MacLeish Assistant Secretary ot State, on the 
understanding that he would tidy up the language at the San 
Francisco proceedings in 1945. And the result is that you can sing 
the U.N. Charter. You can’t sing the present Japanese constitution 
however. It’s really written in very bad Japanese, and that’s very 
understandable, because it wasn’t originally written in Japanese at 
all. It was written first in another language and only then translated 
into Japanese. And as for the other language, one would have to 
acknowledge that it was written in American English, and not 
English English before it was translated back into Japanese. Now 
when I spoke to the Japanese Chairman of the Japanese Cabinet 
Commission on the Constitution—a very distinguished and venerable 
legal scholar who, at the time, had 87 years—he asked me, as his 
first question: “ What do you think of Wigmore?” Well, this was a 
strange question from a distinguished Japanese constitutional lawyer, 
even one 87 years old, and so I said, “ Well, in my part of the world 
(this was then Toronto) all day long they talk of nothing else but 
Wigmore.” This may have been a mild exaggeration, but it was 
undoubtedly an appropriate response, because Dr. Kenzo Takayanagi 
was very impressed and said: “ In that case, there must be some 
ultimate grace in Toronto.”7 By comparison, of course, one can 
quite unashamedly tell visiting constitutional authorities: “Come to 
Montreal and we won’t discuss Wigmore or any other doctrinal 
writer: we will simply introduce you to the constitutional ‘living 
law’—our indigenous constitutional revolution.”
The Japanese, as I have said, have certain problems with their 
first post-1945 constitution. First, it is written in rather inelegant 
Japanese, a bad translation of a rather badly drafted English docu­
ment. And second, and this is part, again, of our introductory 
excursus on the quest for justice in post-War Germany, we had 
told the Japanese that theirs was an unjust society because it was 
a militarist society, and that the only way to get a just society in 
Japan was to demilitarise it; and this meant, really, preventing Japan 
from ever going to war again or having the capacity to make war. 
And so we insisted on having written into the post-War Japanese 
constitution provisions which, from the drafting viewpoint, are 
rather effective and foolproof, and which, if properly applied, would
7 The late Dr. Takayanagi had in fact been Wigmore’s student in Chicago, 
shortly after the turn o f the century, when Wigmore was Dean o f the North­
western University Law School; and he had gone on, among other things, 
to become perhaps the foremost Japanese authority on the Anglo-American 
Common Law.
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really prevent the Japanese from ever again developing a military 
presence.
There is only one major drawback in all this, and it might 
almost give rise to an axiom for future constitution makers; beware 
of trying to solve too many immediate problems in your constitu­
tional charter, because the solution to immediate problems may 
involve the creation of insuperable constitutional barriers against 
the solving of later problems that you didn’t anticipate in the first 
place. I suppose nobody anticipated, in the middle and late 1940’s, 
that we might even think it might be good for the Japanese to become 
militaristic again. Yet the Japanese had no sooner obtained their 
new constitution than the Western Allies started putting pressure 
on them to rearm again. But we had also set up, in the post-War 
Japanese constitution, as in the post-War German constitution, a 
constitutional Supreme Court exercising judicial review on the 
American Supreme Court model; and this Japanese Supreme Court 
started taking these disarmament and demilitarization principles of 
the constitution seriously, as any decent and self-respecting, policy­
making Supreme Court would; and some of the Japanese citizens 
started taking these constitutional principles seriously too. They had 
been told that the just society is composed of free-willing individuals, 
—citizen activists or legal militants in the sense envisaged by Dicey; 
grass-roots marching societies composed of Eugene McCarthy-type 
people, who do have a social conscience and who do get a bit upset 
and so, being legally sophisticated, proceed to rush to the nearest 
lawyer in order to file a constitutional complaint. Very soon, indeed, 
a lot of Japanese started doing just this. The Japanese government 
would grant a lease of a piece of land for purposes of a military base 
by the United States or any other of the Western Allies, and some 
citizen would come in and say, this is against the constitution. Or a 
nuclear submarine would come in and somebody would raise the 
issue that this is against the constitution. How do you resolve this 
basic legal dilemma? I would have to say that the Japanese still 
haven’t resolved it; and Dr. Kenzo Takayanagi and his expert Com­
mission, in drafting the blue-prints for the new constitution, recog­
nized that perhaps it was an insoluble problem after all. Dr. Taka- 
yanagi’s Commission in fact produced a beautiful set of constitu­
tional blueprints; except that, when you came to these demilitariza­
tion or anti-War sections of the constitution, the Commission 
recommended absolutely nothing at all. They just sort of left these 
sections a blank, to be filled in later; and this has been the basic 
problem. They really don’t know what to do on it. One group of 
constitutional thinkers in Japan says that the quest for the just 
society in Japan necessarily involves elimination of all the military 
caste, elimination of a military status for Japan: why can’t Japan 
just be a heavy trading country without an army? Another group
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says, “ No; with an ideological struggle going on, we have got to 
make our moral commitment.” In the result, the thing is still being 
fought out in Japan, and the whole beautiful new constitutional 
project is thus being kept on ice pending a resolution of the problem. 
No Japanese government is therefore prepared to bring the new 
constitutional project forward for political adoption; and the likeli­
hood is that one will rest with the old, inelegant constitution simply 
because one can’t solve the political problems inherent in any 
new one.
This, in a way, indicates how very complex and difficult it is 
to take a firm and inflexible position, in one's basic constitutional 
charter, on what the just society concretely amounts to, and it may 
also indicate the dangers of giving free advice from outside—the 
dangers, even more perhaps, of trying to impose a just society on 
anybody else. I suppose this takes us back to one of the basic issues 
of international law that we used to discuss in the immediate post­
w a r years; might it have been better to have left the Germans to 
conduct the Nuremburg trials themselves, rather than having out­
siders do it for them? The risk was, of course, there mightn’t have 
been any trials at all, in that case; but it might have been worth the 
experiment anyway.
Now, if I can take you to a third example before getting back 
to the Canadian problems and the concrete and specific references 
I have promised to Chief Justice McRuer’s work, the Soviet Union 
has an interesting constitution. Again I find, in this new comparative, 
eclectic, period in Canadian law, that footnotes are now being 
dropped in Canada to Soviet constitutional practice—sometimes 
eclectic, period in Canadian law, that footnotes are now being 
dropped in Canada to Soviet constitutional practice, — sometimes 
in the most unlikely areas. I have a great respect for the younger 
generation of French-speaking constitutional jurists in Canada, but 
I am very surprised to find some of them, with a straight face, 
dropping a footnote to the practice of the Soviet Union as a claimed 
precedent as to the conclusion of treaties by constituent republics of 
a federal system. There are, of course, some interesting legal formulae 
contained in Soviet federal constitutional basic arrangements; but 
they aren’t the best legal footnotes, because not really law-in-action.
The Soviet Constitution of 1936 is an interesting document. If 
you are ever drafting a constitutional Bill of Rights and you want 
some nice phrases or a nice general model, you may want to go to 
this. It really is a beautiful Bill of Rights; I think perhaps it may 
be the most beautiful Bill of Rights in any modern constitution. It 
didn’t of course ever work from the time of its first adoption in the 
Stalin Constitution of 1936 until at least the ending of the era of 
political terror with Stalin’s death in 1953. The Stalin Constitution
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of 1936 was a somewhat authoritarian constitution. It was drafted 
after Stalin had executed his principal Law Dean and legal pundit, 
Pashukanis. Pashukanis was a very great legal theorist. He had even 
read Marx, which is better than many modern Russian Law Deans 
and he had worked on the logical consequences, in concrete legal- 
institutional terms, of Marxist theory. He accepted earnestly and 
sincerely this business about the withering away of Law and the 
State as the Socialist society gives way in turn to the Communist 
society. Pashukanis took it all very seriously. One of the things he 
did, in his programme of law reform according to Marxist premises, 
was to re-examine the basic Law Faculty curriculum, in the Uni­
versity of Moscow and elsewhere. If Law and the State are pro­
gressively withering away, why do you need a law of Delicts, or a 
law of Property, or even a Civil Code as a whole? They are all 
historically dated—out-of-date. Pashukanis proposed, therefore, to 
abolish all these things and to set up, in their place, in the law curri­
culum in Moscow, the study of the administration of things. Away 
with the old-line, bourgeois-derived positive law, and in its place 
substitute the Administrative Process. Everything else must go! 
Well this offended a few people! There were, for example, some 
excellent old-line professors of the Civil Law who thus became 
supernumerary, and were unhappy in consequence. And it all 
worried Stalin because somebody told Stalin, “You’ve got to have 
security against the enemies within.” Stalin asked his new legal 
pundit, Vyshinsky, “ How do we get security within?” And Vyshinsky 
replied, “ You’ve got to have a strong, authoritarian constitution” 
(that is, “a good Austinian positivist constitution is what you need”). 
And this is the 1936 Stalin Constitution, with the exception that it 
has this beautiful Bill of Rights in it. By the way, Pashukanis, as a 
fallen legal pundit, was put on trial for wrecking: (this was a great 
period when foreign engineers and early political associates of Lenin 
were on trial for sabotage). And the substance of the count against 
Pashukanis was that he had tried to wreck the Soviet legal system 
by modernizing it and sweeping away all the time-worn bourgeois- 
liberal survivals and encrustations. Pashukanis is, I believe, the 
first and, one hopes, the last Law Dean in history to be executed 
for his crimes. In one of the more recent issues of Soviet State and 
Law , I think you will all be happy to learn, thirty years or more 
after Pashukanis’ execution, there’s a very happy, posthumous, 
article8 that concedes at last that Pashukanis was a man who had 
some ideas and was interested in society, and that in his own way, 
even if mistaken, he laboured for the improvement of Socialist 
mankind. Well this is very good—it’s just a little bit late!
8 L.P., Pamyati Evgeniya Bronislavovicha Pashukanis, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo 
i Pravo (no. 8, 1968), p. 150.
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Now I cite the Russian example because Russia itself went 
through a crisis in the middle 1950’s, the period known as de- 
Stalinization. I think if any of you have met any members of the 
current Soviet legal establishment you will quickly become aware 
that, in certain areas—criminal law, procedural law—these people 
are extremely good. It is interesting but also quite embarrassing to 
go to the Academy of Arts and Sciences and meet the members of 
the special section, the Institute of State and Law, and to talk to 
the specialists, for example, on Canadian law. They have people 
who have spent a lot of time studying Canadian law. They are really 
very able people.
Now, in their quest for justice in this post-Stalin period, every­
body had to concede that the Stalin era had been a period of police- 
state terrorism that was in force roughly from the end of the N.E.P. 
period in the Soviet Union, about 1928, until some years after Stalin’s 
death in 1953. The dictator, as we all know, began to suffer a decline 
in personality—a tremendous psychological decline—and in the end 
was an extremely vicious old man, endowed with absolute power.
The emphasis of the Soviet law reformers, in the era of de- 
Stalinization that followed Stalin’s death, very interestingly has been 
on criminal jurisdiction and criminal procedure. This recalls, of 
course, Maitland’s basic teaching that you find your substantive 
constitutional law in the interstices of procedure. The emphasis of 
the Soviet reformers really has been in this area, and I commend to 
you, in this regard, the studies made by the Soviet Commission on 
reform of the Criminal Code and the draft principles of legislation 
that the Commission produced.
The Commission pressed for the abolition o f the special courts, 
and I think this was right. They pressed for the abolition of retro­
active crimes. Well you can cite a footnote here to the United States 
Constitution; and this they did as well as looking to other Western 
legal experience. They also pressed for a right to counsel, including 
such a right at the preliminary, pre-trial proceedings. This was a 
little bit more venturesome and innovatory, because the Soviet 
internal law system is Civil Law, and not Common Law at base— 
strongly influenced by German civil law and French civil law; and 
this emphasis on the right to counsel and the emphasis on the 
pre-trial proceedings is a little bit strange in Civil Law terms, in 
comparison with the Common Law. I remember when Gary Powers, 
the U-2 pilot, was on trial; many people said: “This is disgraceful; 
he has confessed his case away before he was even put on trial, in 
his pre-trial examination; this is the Communist system of law.” It 
wasn’t really; it was the Civil Law system in action in terms of the 
Continental European criminal pre-trial investigation; but it still, 
perhaps, in comparison to the Common Law system, leaves much
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to be desired in terms of basic protections for the accused. And this 
was one of the areas in which the Soviet Commission on the reform 
of the Criminal Code pressed for changes.
The Commission also pressed for the elimination of vague 
concepts of criminality—“rubber concepts” , so called because you 
can stretch them to cover almost anything you want. The famous, or 
infamous, Parasite Law—the law under which the Soviet beatnik 
poets were tried recently—has a vague relationship to our own 
vagrancy law. You know you want to pick somebody up and you 
haven’t got any real evidence, so you charge him with being without 
visible means of support. In terms of the Soviet Parasite Law, if you 
are a poet with long hair and a beard and you are sitting in coffee 
houses and not engaged in socially productive labour, you may end 
up being charged with parasitism. It’s not actually a criminal charge, 
but it has what we would call criminal consequences. In the beatnik 
poets’ cases, they were picked up from the coffee houses and in 
effect exiled to rural areas. One of them, I remember, ended up 
carrying manure in Archangel, right behind the Arctic circle. It was 
all very salutary, I believe; but many Russians felt (and still feel, 
if you have been following the protests now going on) that this 
isn’t the sort of legal provision and remedy that a de-Stalinized legal 
system should permit.
Again we see the strong emphasis on the strengthening of 
institutional controls upon administrative process and upon the 
operation of the bureaucracy generally. The institution of the Soviet 
Procuracy has a root that goes back to the French procureur du roi 
and Continental Civil Law administrative law concepts. But I think 
the big impact of the changes, in the period of legal de-Stalinization 
in the Soviet Union, has been a strengthening of its independence; 
and a strengthening, if you wish, of the concept of a countervailing 
power against administrative arrogance and general governmental 
arbitrariness.
A final point that I would stress, in the case of the Soviet Union, 
is the de-centralization of policy-making along geographical lines— 
a new emphasis on federalism. I became aware of this, in a physical 
sense I suppose, when a Russian student landed in my office in 
Toronto several years ago and said he was there to study federalism. 
And in fact he stayed for a full academic year. I don’t want to stress 
this point too much, and in any case I am certainly not raising it 
merely to provide some sort of comparative law footnotes purport­
ing to demonstrate that because the Ukraine and Byelorussia can 
make international accords in their own right and actually sit in the 
United Nations General Assembly, Quebec or any other Canadian 
Province should have the same rights or privileges too. Such 
examples, rooted as they are in the law-in-books and not necessarily
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corresponding to actual de facto  power relationships within the legal 
system concerned, are neither very persuasive nor even very relevant 
in comparative law terms. I think we are beginning to see develop, 
however, a new pluralistic approach to law in the Soviet Union. It 
may be, in time, that you will be able to read books in Moscow 
that you could not read, or would not wish to read, in Ulan Bator: 
just as you read today freely in Montreal what you certainly would 
not approve of reading in Toronto. It may also be that you will 
be able to have plural marriages in Tashkent, where monogamy 
reigns supreme in Volgagrad: like the wide variation in family law 
as between the Canadian Provinces. This is what I mean by a new 
pluralistic approach to Soviet Law. I am stressing this, because the 
emphasis in the era of de-Stalinization on the part of the Soviet Law 
reformers—and I am sure they were correct in their choice—was 
never on the Constitutional Bill of Rights. That Bill of Rights, as 
proclaimed in the Stalin Constitution of 1936 and still in force 
today, is a beautiful piece of work in a purely literary, law-in-books 
sense; yet nobody ever bothers about it. The emphasis of the Soviet 
Law reformers, instead, has been on institutional changes and 
procedurally-based remedies; and I think in this sense Chief Justice 
McRuer and earlier speakers have been right to remind us that this 
emphasis is part of the general Common Law tradition; and while 
it may be peculiar to us in one sense, maybe there are elements in 
it that can be exported usefully to other countries; just as, of course, 
the institution of a policy-making constitutional Supreme Court has 
been exported to Germany and Japan; and we have seen it work 
in those countries.
Now, I was recently re-reading what I had said to Chief Justice 
McRuer’s Commission on Civil Rights in the Province of Ontario 
when I gave evidence before it several years ago. One is aware that 
the late Mr. Justice Jackson—Robert Jackson, you probably know, 
was the last lawyer in the United States to go to the Supreme Court 
without a law degree, growing up through the law office system—was 
once reminded by counsel, when he was sitting on a case in the 
United States Supreme Court, of an official opinion that he had 
given to the United States Government on some point of law, in 
the period immediately prior to his appointment to the Court. 
Counsel said,“ Look, Mr. Justice Jackson, I now cite Robert Jackson, 
Solicitor-General of the United States.” And Mr. Justice Jackson 
replied in effect: “That was then and this is now: why should I be 
influenced by earlier partisan advocacy in a lost cause? What’s the 
next point?” , and on he went. Well, I would have to say, on re­
reading what I said to Chief Justice McRuer several years ago, that 
I’m not sure I would necessarily say all the same things, the same 
way, today. One gets more cautious even in the space of a few years. 
But I did make certain suggestions in the Ontario context in which
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I was then speaking, that I think make sense today in more general, 
Canadian terms.
It seems to me again that the main emphasis in the quest for 
justice in our own society in the foreseeable future, is probably 
going to have to be procedural and institutional. What I suggested 
then, in the Ontario context, was that we should take advantage of 
the fact that we are a racially plural society; that we are no longer 
monolithic in an ethnic-cultural sense, if we ever were; and that 
we must try to take in some of the best ideas from other systems. 
One of the concrete suggestions that I made, then, for Ontario 
was for introduction of an administrative procedure code.
A further suggestion that I made then was for a special ad­
ministrative review and appeals tribunal. I think any of us who 
have seen the French Conseil d 'litat in operation are aware of the 
great virtues of that body as a specialized tribunal, as a tribunal of 
experts, and as a tribunal that has the confidence of the general 
public.
Now in Poland and Yugoslavia, also, the Communist lawyers 
are very interesting people. When you meet them, you soon become 
aware that being a lawyer in theif countries—and I mean here a 
socially effective lawyer—is, in effect, to become a specialist in the 
art of the possible, the politically possible. If you say: “ Here I am, 
a decent man with some ideas and some training and a position 
from which to make or influence policy” , it’s not much use producing 
an abstract, ivory-tower document. You want to see your legal 
ideas in action and really concretized as community “ living law” ; 
and I notice, here, that the Polish Law Reform Commission that’s 
advising Prime Minister Cyrankiewics and trying effectively to 
operate within the limits of the politically possible, is also pressing 
the Conseil d '£ ta t idea. In terms of the strict Principle of Socialist 
Legality, it may seem a rather strange institutional form for socialist 
law to take. But there is one big advantage in Poland, in comparison 
to some other Communist countries: the pre-war Polish lawyers 
used to study in Paris, and they think in the French way. This is 
true of the circle of legally-trained persons immediately around the 
Prime Minister.
The same thing is true also in Yugoslavia. The Conseil d '£ ta t 
becomes a particular institutional method for achieving a just society, 
within the politically possible limits imposed by the fact that you’re 
part of a larger ideologically-based association that may also carry 
over, as we were reminded in recent weeks, into the internal law 
system. I think they will get away with these institutional reforms 
in Poland; and I think they may even spread from Poland back to 
the Soviet Union, because one of the problems, of course, in the 
Soviet Union is administrative arbitrariness, administrative arro­
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gance, the problem of big government. You can run a big govern­
ment by force, of course; but it’s a very inefficient and uneconomical 
use of power. And ultimately, as lawyers interested in social control, 
you are interested in what Mr. Justice Frankfurter used to call 
the achievement and application of the more moderate controls, 
forms of social control that require less expenditure of force and 
naked power, and that inflict less deprivations upon other, widely 
held community interests and aspirations.
The Soviet response has been limited to the particular measures 
I have mentioned, with perhaps the strongest emphasis being on the 
institution of the Procuracy. But I think that their court structure 
will need some substantial strengthening and reform too.
Before the Ombudsman had become as fashionable a legal 
institution as he now is today, I had myself counselled his merits 
to Ontario. I suppose, if we get an office of Ombudsman here, it 
will go eventually the way of Equity. It will start out as something 
great, pure, and noble and unfettered; and in the end it will become 
bogged down in its own precedents and its own decisions. But 
within that life cycle, it might be interesting and it might be chal­
lenging.
A further major measure that I suggested for Ontario had 
recollections o f the Roncarelli decision,9 and of the fact that 
Roncarelli could be achieved very easily in Quebec (although this 
isn’t necessarily part of the Supreme Court rationale) because of the 
Quebec Civil Code, but that it might not be achieved so easily in 
the Common Law provinces. There is a principle of the public 
responsibility of the public official. It is a common-place, of course, 
of Continental European Civil Law jurisprudence. I think perhaps 
we ought to have a statute of this sort. It will breed a lot of litigation; 
there isn’t any question of that. It may also add an extra harassment 
to over-worked, over-burdened governmental officials: they are 
certainly under fire these days on every count. But I think it would 
be an important, institutionally-based step in the path to justice.
This brings me, now, to the issue of a constitutional Bill of 
Rights, whether specially entrenched in the constitution or other­
wise. You will remember that the federal government of Canada, 
in its approach to constitutional reform and rewriting in Canada, 
has placed its main emphasis up to date—indeed, a well-nigh exclusive 
emphasis—on achieving an entrenched federal Bill of Rights as part 
of the constitution, and has given it the top priority in all its constitu­
tional talks and discussions. My own opinion, in contrast, is that 
the project for a federal Bill of Rights is not the top priority in terms
9 Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689; analysed by the present 
writer in 37 Canadian Bar Review 503 (1959).
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of the quest for justice in Canada, today, and is not likely to become 
so in the foreseeable future.
Now, if you read my brief to the McRuer Commission in 
Ontario, you might feel that there is an inconsistency here; because 
I did make the case, there, for a Provincial Bill of Rights in the 
Province of Ontario.10 Such action, at the Provincial level, seems 
to me, in contrast tp any action at the federal level at this time, to 
offer immediate prospects of being helpful and educational, and of 
really operating as norms of community “ living law”—of really 
being law-in-action, and not just law-in-books or legal folk-lore. I 
commented, in some of my publications in recent years, on the 
differing positions taken, in civil liberties matters, between different 
sections in Canada. What one Province feels to be obscene, another 
Province may feel to be merely titillating or even boring; and what 
one Province feels to be an unwarranted trampling on the liberties 
of expression of the individual citizen, another Province may feel 
to be the imposition of necessary minimum community controls on 
insulting and provocative behaviour on the part of an aggressive 
or reckless minority, directed against other citizens.
We are looking, here, to a striking of the balance between 
differing, and sometimes directly competing or conflicting, com­
munity interests. This is the modern, interests-oriented approach to 
law, where the beginning of wisdom is to recognize, as Mr. Justice 
Holmes himself recognized in the speech and communication area, 
that there are no absolute interests; and that you have got to strike 
the balance, among the competing interests, against a background 
of societal facts. And in different periods, of course, communities 
may choose to strike the balance in rather different ways.
I was giving some lectures at the Sorbonne last Spring, a few 
days only before the student irruptions; and one could see the trouble 
starting. But what the French students regarded as a vindication of 
their own personal interests in speech and communication, the 
French workers, unfortunately for the students, soon concluded 
was an unnecessary and irresponsible destruction of hard-gained 
economic assets. Workers’ cars were burned, if you remember, in 
the student fracas; and the French automobile insurance policies 
simply don’t cover such things. Well I suppose you could suggest 
that you could vindicate both groups of interests at the same time— 
the students’ claimed speech interests and the workers’ undoubted 
property interests—if the French government would only fill the 
gap in the automobile insurance contracts and assume responsibility 
for losses a i .i  damages resulting from students’ riots and disorders. 
Most people in France, however, seemed fairly quickly to conclude
10 A new base for Civil Liberties, Canadian Bar Journal, (February, 1965), p. 28, 
at pp. 31-2.
U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL 59
that the speech interests asserted by the students were rather slight— 
the speech, perhaps by reason of the manner and mode of its exercise 
by the students, was of little social value—and so they quickly 
resolved the interests-conflicts by supporting the government crack­
down on the students.
I made the comment in the Canadian context, though, that in 
the speech and communication versus public order range of cases, 
there had been differences between, for example, problems stemming 
from Quebec, and problems stemming from Ontario and the other 
English-speaking Provinces; and that these differences were some­
times directly reflected in concrete judicial attitudes and decisions 
in the Supreme Court of Canada.11 A very distinguished jurist— 
one of the leading French-Canadian constitutional authorities of our 
time—commented on my thesis and suggested, in effect, that it was 
divisive, and not a service to national unity perhaps, to offer such 
an interpretation.12 On the other hand, another French-speaking 
lawyer said, in a related context, that maybe it was constructive to 
have some English-speaking lawyer stating the constitutional facts- 
of-life for once.13 Both of these French-speaking lawyers ran in the 
last elections, though on different sides, and with rather different 
results as we all know.
But my own feeling, in regard to the Bill of Rights or similar 
entrenched constitutional charter of fundamental rights, is that it 
might be best to start at the Provincial level. I hope that those of 
you who are from the Province of Ontario will press for an Ontario 
Bill of Rights. But I do feel that any action at the federal level could 
perhaps wait on, and certainly not attempt to anticipate, the action 
at the Provincial level.
Incidentally, if any of you who have been following the work 
of the Ontario Commission on Civil Rights, have also been following 
the work of its Quebec equivalent, you may have been surprised— 
I don’t think, however, that you really should have been surprised, 
having regard to the quality of the Quebec legal tradition—by the 
richness of the discussion, and also the imagination, of the new 
bill of rights that has been worked out for insertion in the new 
draft revised Civil Code of the Province of Quebec.14 Quebec today 
is producing a lot of worthwhile new legal ideas, its younger lawyers 
being in many ways far more eclectic in their approach to the solu­
11 See, for example, Comparative Federalism. States' Rights and National 
Power, (2nd ed., 1965), pp. 76-7; Federal Constitution-making for a Multi­
national World (1966), pp. 93-97 ; Judicial Review (4th ed., 1969), pp. 244-5.
12 See Book Review (Marcel Faribault) 26 La Revue du Barreau de la Province 
de Québec 325, at pp. 333-5 (May, 1966).
13 See Book Review (Pierre-Elliott Trudeau), Revue du Notariat (Québec), 
(April, 1963).
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tion o f legal problems than their counterparts in the English- 
speaking provinces.
I think I wouldn’t properly complete our discussion if I didn’t 
make some reference to the quest for justice in Canada in relation 
to the quest for justice in the wider context of the world community. 
We are aware that we live in an increasingly inter-dependent and 
inter-related world community. It is almost trite by now to say this; 
but I think that governments are becoming increasingly aware that 
individual citizens today recognize that problems don’t stop with 
the national frontiers.
Many of the present audience have been involved in recent 
weeks in the public debate on the civil war in Nigeria and the 
Biafran problem. I was myself involved in the debate, in late August, 
in the Council of the International Law Association, meeting in 
Buenos Aires, on the legal aspects of the Czechoslovakian crisis.15 
I had great difficulty in persuading thoughtful colleagues from major 
countries in the West (and in the East, too, though we expected 
that), that what was done in Czechoslovakia wasn’t particularly 
desirable and that it wasn’t compatible with the rule of law on the 
world scale; and that it wasn’t even good co-existence, contemporary 
post-Stalin style.
This is a position I wouldn’t hesitate to repeat, and I think it 
is a position that Canadian citizens increasingly take. And it seems 
to me, therefore, that a good deal of the attention of governments 
in the future, in the quest for the just society, will involve the recogni­
tion of this: that we can no longer think of ourselves as an island 
to ourselves, and that we have to be concerned with what’s going 
on in the rest of the world. It’s going, of course, to be a limiting 
factor in our internal economic policies and in the quest for national 
economic well-being. And it’s also going to be a limiting factor in 
the deployment of intellectual energies and resources to the matter 
of internal law reform. But I think it is worth the effort to try to 
take a more inclusive, comprehensive approach to the quest for 
justice in our own society, and to recognize that the just society 
is hardly likely to be attained and maintained at home, if it is not 
part of the achievement of a more comprehensive international law 
of human dignity throughout the World Community as a whole.
14 Civil Code Revision Office, Report o f the Civil Rights Committee. First 
Part: Draft Modifying the Civil Code relating to Civil Rights (Montreal, 
1966).
15 International Law Association. Report o f the Biennial Reunion, Buenos 
Aires, 1968 (1969).
